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Sitting judges don’t get to practice law.1 So although they often opine
on the dos and don’ts of effective advocacy,2 we rarely get to see them put
their advice into practice. But a few years ago, a class-action lawsuit
provided the rare opportunity to witness a federal judge acting as an
advocate before another federal judge—if not in the role of attorney, then
certainly in as close to that role as we are likely to see. Given the chance to
employ his own advice about effective advocacy, would the judge—Alex
Kozinski—practice what he preaches? Would his years of experience on
the other side of the bench inform his written advocacy, or would he
succumb to the same temptations that frequently undermine the advocacy
of practicing lawyers? It turns out that Judge Kozinski’s written advocacy
did flout some persuasive-writing conventions, but it was persuasive,
anyway. I wanted to figure out why. And I wanted to figure out whether his
advocacy suggests lessons for practicing attorneys who might be tempted
to adopt his approach.
In 2012, a class action lawsuit was filed in the Central District of California
against the car manufacturer Nissan.3 The lawsuit alleged significant problems
with the battery in the Nissan LEAF, the carmaker’s electric vehicle. Alex
Kozinski, then the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit, was a Nissan LEAF
owner—and a very unhappy one. And as a Nissan LEAF owner, Kozinski was a
* Clinical Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School. Thank you to Maureen Carroll and Tim Pinto for helpful
comments.
1 See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 4(A)(5).
2 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA AND BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING JUDGES (2008); Jim
Moseley, Persuasive Briefs: Tips for the First-Time Writer, TEx. LAWYER, Apr. 23, 2012, at 18; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks
on Appellate Advocacy, 50 S.C. L. REV. 567 (Spring 1999); Alex Kozinski, The Wrong Stuff, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 325 (1992);
Richard A. Posner, Convincing a Federal Court of Appeals, 25 LITIG. 3 (Winter 1999).
3 Class Action Complaint, Klee v. Nissan North American, Inc. (C.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2012) (No. CV12-08238).
class member—also a very unhappy one. So unhappy that, when the parties
notified class members of their opportunity to object to the proposed
settlement, Judge Kozinski and his wife4 responded with a thirty-seven-page
Objection to Class Action Settlement (“First Objection”).5 They followed that a
month later with a thirty-page Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final
Approval of Class Action Settlement (“Second Objection”).6 The Objections
received plenty of coverage in the legal press.7 But surprisingly, no reports
analyzed the Objections as written advocacy from someone with years of expe-
rience on the bench.
And we have many principles of written advocacy by which to assess
Kozinski’s Objections, since so much has been written on the subject. The
legal community—and especially the legal writing community—has
coalesced around many principles of persuasive writing. Taken as a whole,
I think of these principles as the canons of effective advocacy. Judges
routinely promote the canon. Kozinski himself has done so. For example,
in his article, “The Wrong Stuff,” Kozinski provides tongue-in-cheek
advice on the best strategies to use if your goal is to lose your case—with
the obvious implication that attorneys who want to win should avoid his
“suggestions.”8 In part I below I discuss his specific advice—and other
examples from the canons of effective advocacy—and contrast that advice
with Kozinski’s Objections. In part II, I suggest some theories to explain
Kozinski’s deviation from the canon and why his Objections are effective,
nevertheless. And in part III, I describe how the result in the case suggests
Kozinski’s advocacy was effective and offer some concluding thoughts for
practicing attorneys.
4 Though Judge Kozinski filed the Objections jointly with his wife Marcy Tiffany, who is herself a lawyer, I am assuming that
Kozinski is the primary author of the Objections. At a conference about class actions, Judge Kozinski did say, in reference to
the Objections: “Marcy and I wrote an opposition.” Alex Kozinski, The Future of Class Action Litigation: Keynote by Chief
Judge Alex Kozinski 13:09-12 (NYU Sch. Law video Nov. 11, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zipvHeC42Lw [here-
inafter Kozinski Keynote]. But they read like something he wrote. Regardless, he either wrote or approved of everything they
contain, so it is fair to attribute the Objections to him. And it was Judge Kozinski—not his wife—who spoke at the court
hearing on the proposed settlement, which suggests he was driving this train. Civil Minutes–General for Motion(s) Hearing,
Klee v. Nissan North American, Inc. (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013) (No. CV12-08238).
5 Objection to Class Action Settlement, Klee v. Nissan North American, Inc. (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2013) (No. CV12-08238)
[hereinafter First Objection].
6 Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, Klee v. Nissan North American, Inc. (C.D.
Cal. November 10, 2013) (No. CV12-08238) [hereinafter Second Objection].
7 See, e.g., Alison Frankel, Lawyers’ Nightmare: When 9th Circuit Chief Judge Kozinski is Class Objector, REUTERS L. BLOG
(Nov. 20. 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2013/11/20/lawyers-nightmare-when-9th-circuit-chief-judge-
kozinski-is-class-objector/; Debra Cassens Weiss, Electric-car owner Alex Kozinski offers ‘scathing’ objection in class action,
ABA JOURNAL (Nov. 21, 2013, 11:45 AM CST), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/nissan_leaf_owner_
alex_kozinski_is_scathing/; William Peacock, Esq., Kozinski Crashes Nissan Leaf Settlement Party—As a Plaintiff, FINDLAW
(Nov. 22, 2013, 3:37 PM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/ninth_circuit/2013/11/kozinski-crashes-nissan-leaf-settlement-party----
as-a-plaintiff.html. 
8 Kozinski, supra note 2, at 325.
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I. Kozinski’s Objections: The Good, the Bad, and the
Ugly
Kozinski’s Objections take issue with both the substance of the Nissan
LEAF settlement and the process by which it was reached. Substantively,
Kozinski attacks the settlement as worthless because it provides only an
enhanced warranty for the battery, and, according to Kozinski, Nissan had
already provided that to all class members in response to consumer
complaints. And he attacks the enhanced warranty as itself inadequate to
address all of the problems with the LEAF’s battery that the Complaint
describes. As a result, according to Kozinski, the settlement would leave
class members worse off, because it would require them to give up their
right to sue in return for nothing of value. He also attacks the fee class
counsel would receive under the settlement—$1.9 million—as outra-
geously high and undeserved, especially because class counsel did minimal
work. They took no discovery from Nissan before reaching the settlement
and so didn’t learn anything about the battery problems or Nissan’s
knowledge of them. Kozinski asserts that, as a result, class counsel couldn’t
possibly know whether they were getting a good deal for the class.
Kozinski’s Objections adhere to the canons of effective advocacy in
several ways. They express a core theory that threads his arguments
together: the settlement is the product of no work by the attorneys that
offers no benefits to the class. The Objections use facts persuasively. They
are written with Kozinski’s usual bracing clarity in a highly accessible style.
They are organized to lead the reader through the arguments effortlessly,
with helpful headings as a guide. In short, both Objections are engaging
and reader-friendly, as all effective advocacy must be.
But frankly, it’s more fun to consider how the objections deviate from
the canons of effective advocacy. Let’s take a look:
A. Attacks on Counsel
The canon is clear that attacks on counsel are ineffective. In “The
Wrong Stuff,” Kozinski has this advice for attorneys looking to convince
the court that their arguments are stinkers: “One really good way of doing
this is to pick a fight with opposing counsel. Go ahead, call him a slime.
Accuse him of lying through his teeth. . . . [Tell the court that what] is
really going on here is a fight between the forces of truth, justice, purity
and goodness—namely you—and Beelzebub, your opponent.”9 Justice
Ginsburg has said that “[a] top quality brief . . . scratches put[-]downs and
indignant remarks about one’s adversary . . . .”10 And in their book,
9 Kozinski, supra note 2, at 328. 10 Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 568.
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“Making Your Case,” Justice Scalia and legal writing expert Bryan Garner
advise advocates not to “accuse opposing counsel of chicanery or bad
faith, even if there is some evidence of it.”11
It is somewhat surprising, then, that Kozinski’s Objections to the
Nissan settlement are filled with accusations that the lawyers for both
parties are ethics-challenged liars, and that they colluded to enrich and
protect themselves to the detriment of the class. As discussed in section II
below, collusion is a risk present in class-action lawsuits, and Rule 23 tries
to manage this risk by requiring the court to ensure that counsel is acting
in the class’s interests. But raising a concern about collusion doesn’t
require the level of contempt for counsel that Kozinski demonstrates. He
could have laid out all of the facts and then said something like this:
“These facts raise the possibility of collusion between class counsel and
Nissan’s counsel. At a minimum, they suggest that class counsel have put
their own interests first and therefore are not representing the class
adequately.”
Instead, Kozinski baldly asserts that the Nissan attorneys are “in
cahoots” with Plaintiffs’ counsel to “buy[] off ” the named plaintiffs’
consent “to a settlement that causes nothing but harm to the other class
members.”12 After describing how favorable the proposed settlement is to
Nissan, Kozinski writes, “but it could not have been achieved without the
duplicity of Plaintiffs’ Counsel.”13 He writes that “Plaintiffs’ Counsel used
the threat of future class suits to extract for themselves a nice bounty,”14
and that Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s incentive was to “get the settlement finalized
so they could cash in their bounty.”15 He writes that “Counsel [for the
Plaintiffs] misled the court” when they claimed that the proposed
settlement was “just what Plaintiffs asked for.”16 As for the Defendant,
Kozinski writes,
We know for a fact that Nissan lies to its customers. Nissan is, after all,
engaging in a huge deception right now by representing to this Court
that it is implementing the warranty in order to settle its case, while
telling its customers that it’s doing so to “improve our customers’ satis-
faction” and “put customer minds at ease.”17
Kozinski concludes his First Objection by asking the court to refer the
attorneys on both sides to the California State Bar “for investigation of
11 SCALIA AND GARNER, supra note 2, at 34.
12 First Objection, supra note 5, at 27–28.
13 Id. at 14.
14 Id. at 35.
15 Second Objection, supra note 6, at 5.
16 First Objection, supra note 5, at 21 (quoting
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class
Action Settlement at 1, Klee v. Nissan North American, Inc.,
(C.D. Cal. July 8, 2013) (No. CV12-08238).
17 Second Objection, supra note 6, at 10.
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misconduct in the negotiation of this phony settlement.”18 And he asks for
the appointment of a Special Master “to determine whether counsel
should be sanctioned for their lack of candor to the court and betrayal of
the class.”19
But maybe this was one of those rare instances in which the attorneys
were acting unethically? No. Kozinski himself eventually admitted that
they weren’t (or at least that Plaintiffs’ Counsel weren’t). After he filed his
First Objection, Kozinski met with Plaintiffs’ Counsel. He then filed a one-
page amendment to his Objection that said he was “now convinced that
Plaintiffs’ Counsel acted in good faith” and that he was “withdraw[ing] any
suggestion that Plaintiffs’ Counsel acted unethically in the conduct of this
litigation.”20 In other words, he had too quickly concluded that the
substantive deficiencies in the proposed settlement were the product of
unethical representation by class counsel, and he had (wrongly) made that
accusation a cornerstone of his initial, thiry-seven-page Objection.
B. Snark. Hyperbole. Anger.
In “Making Your Case,” Scalia and Garner urge advocates to
“[r]estrain your emotions”21 and to “[c]ultivate a tone of civility, showing
that you are not blinded by passion.”22 In his book “The Winning Brief,”
Garner tells advocates to “[b]e the voice of reason—with a tone of
unflappable calm. Forswear hyperbole and personality attacks.”23 He
writes that “[c]hurlish, bellicose writing suggests a loss of self-control,
which itself points to personal failings that can only make a lawyer less
effective.”24
The media described Kozinski’s Objections as “scathing,”25
“withering,”26 and comprising “thirty[]pages of rage.”27 And that’s accurate.
The Objections are filled with hyperbole and snarky attacks on the parties
and their arguments. In multiple places, Kozinski describes the settlement
as a “sham”28 and “bogus.”29 After quoting class counsel’s statement that
18 First Objection, supra note 5, at 35.
19 Id. at 3.
20 Amendment to Objection at 1, Klee v. Nissan North
American, Inc. (C.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2013) (No. CV12-08238).
The record doesn’t illuminate Kozinski’s reasons for with-
drawing his suggestion of unethical conduct with respect to
only Plaintiffs’ Counsel. Presumably, Plaintiffs’ Counsel
reached out to him after he filed his First Objection, and
Defendant’s Counsel did not.
21 SCALIA AND GARNER, supra note 2, at 34.
22 Id. at 34.
23 BRYAN A. GARNER, THE WINNING BRIEF: 100 TIPS FOR
PERSUASIVE BRIEFING IN TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS
459 (3d ed. 2014).
24 Id. at 461.
25 Weiss, supra note 7.
26 Y. Peter Kang, Nissan Leaf Class Deal “Smacks of
Collusion,” Court Told, LAW360 (May 27, 2015, 4:27pm
EDT), http://www.law360.com/articles/660518/nissan-leaf-
class-deal-smacks-of-collusion-court-told.
27 Peacock, supra note 7. 
28 First Objection, supra note 5, at 2.
29 Id. at 3, 37.
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class members would receive the enhanced warranty only through the
settlement, he inserts a paragraph consisting entirely of a single word:
Hokum.30
Kozinski describes Nissan as hoping to “wipe out future lawsuits by
pesky consumers.”31 In attacking the $5,000 the named plaintiffs would
receive under the settlement, Kozinski writes, “So, [the named plaintiffs]
turned over a few papers, chatted with class counsel and let someone look
at their cars. The Named Plaintiffs did so little, [counsel] had to repeat the
list twice just to fill out a paragraph” in the settlement Memorandum.32 He
also describes the Memorandum as containing “a bunch of lame excuses
by Plaintiffs’ Counsel for turning tail and running.”33
In the settlement Memorandum, class counsel assured the court that
the settlement responded to consumer concerns “as expressed on blogs
and in Internet message boards.”34 Kozinski responds with this: “Objectors
are not impressed by counsel’s claim that they deserve to be paid huge
sums for surfing the Internet.”35 And this: “In other words, in evaluating
the settlement, Plaintiff ’s Counsel engaged in some mighty aggressive
Googling and then assuaged their concerns by relying on self-serving
documents . . . spoon-fed to them by Nissan.”36
Kozinski writes that “Plaintiffs’ Counsel applaud themselves heartily
for the brilliant settlement they supposedly extracted from Nissan.”37 He
urges the court to “disregard counsel’s last-minute attempt to slap lipstick
on this porcine settlement.”38 He concludes by suggesting that Plaintiffs’
lawyers, having done almost no work on behalf of the class, are now “free
to use [their] $1.9 million fee from the LEAF settlement to buy themselves
Teslas.”39 And those are just some of the snarky comments that Kozinski
sprinkles liberally throughout his sixty-seven pages of argument. It’s all
fun to read, but I suspect it wouldn’t fly if filed by an attorney appearing
before Judge Kozinski, himself.
30 Id. at 4.
31 Id. at 8.
32 Id. at 26.
33 Id. at 29.
34 Notice of Motion and Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement; Memorandum of Points
and Authorities at 6, Klee v. Nissan North American, Inc. (C.D. Cal. July 8, 2013) (No. CV12-08238) [hereinafter Preliminary
Settlement Memorandum].
35 First Objection, supra note 5, at 31.
36 Id. at 32.
37 Second Objection, supra note 6, at 2.
38 Id. at 8.
39 Id. at 27.
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C. Intensifiers
Intensifiers are those little words and phrases—“clearly” “it is obvious”
“there can be no doubt”—that advocates use as a crutch. At best, they are
a lazy writer’s way to avoid showing the reader that the point is clear or
obvious. At worst, they are an ineffective attempt to mask the fact that the
point is actually not clear or obvious—or correct. Nearly every authority
on legal writing advises advocates to eschew intensifiers.40
But Kozinski uses plenty of them. He writes that Plaintiffs’ Counsel
have “clearly” placed their own interests first,41 that “it’s clear” that Nissan
has already given consumers what the settlement purports to provide,42
that “[i]t’s perfectly clear” that Nissan learned about the battery problems
from consumers and not from the lawsuit,43 and that “it seems perfectly
clear that plaintiffs have an excellent case” (i.e., not a difficult one that
would warrant a large payout to class counsel).44 He writes that “[i]t is
perfectly obvious that Plaintiffs’ Counsel did very little useful work on this
case,”45 that “[i]t is obvious” that the parties’ estimate of the potential value
of the settlement is worthless,46 and, after asking a rhetorical question
about what class counsel did to deserve their fee, that “[t]he obvious
answer is that they delivered the class to Nissan on a silver platter” so
Nissan could protect itself against future claims.47 Kozinski twice states
that there is “no doubt” that consumers have already received the sole
benefit of the settlement—the enhanced warranty48—and also writes that
“it’s plain as day” that Nissan was planning to provide the enhanced
warranty regardless of the lawsuit.49
D. Length
In “The Wrong Stuff,” the first piece of advice Kozinski provides to
attorneys who “want to tell the judges right up front that you have a rotten
case” is “to write a fat brief.”50 Similarly, Judge Patricia Wald complains
that “[t]he more paper [lawyers] throw at us, the meaner we get, the more
40 See, e.g., ALExA Z. CHEW & KATIE ROSE GUEST PRYAL,
THE COMPLETE LEGAL WRITER 394 (2016) (“[I]ntensifiers
often have the opposite effect and actually make your
argument less compelling.”); GARNER, supra note 23, at 520
(“Shun clearly, obviously, and their dogmatic siblings.”);
MARY BETH BEAZLEY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO APPELLATE
ADVOCACY 266–67 (4th ed. 2014) (Intensifiers “have been
so overused that they go beyond having no meaning to
having a negative meaning.”). 
41 First Objection, supra note 5, at 3
42 Id. at 7.
43 Second Objection, supra note 6, at 9.
44 Id. at 12.
45 First Objection, supra note 5, at 33.
46 Second Objection, supra note 6, at 18.
47 First Objection, supra note 5, at 34.
48 Id. at 6, 14.
49 Id. at 34.
50 Kozinski, supra note 2, at 326. Judge Kozinski recently
provided a colorful example of his disdain for “fat briefs.” He
dissented from a Ninth Circuit order granting a request
from a litigant to file a brief that exceeded the permitted
word limit, and stated that he wouldn’t read beyond the
limit imposed by the court’s rules. Order at 3–4, Cuevas v.
Hartley (9th Cir. Aug. 4, 2016) (No. 12-55807) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
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irritated and hostile we feel . . . . Repetition, extraneous facts, over-long
arguments (by the 20th page, we are muttering to ourselves, ‘I get it, I get
it. No more for God’s sake.’) still occur more often than capable counsel
should tolerate.”51
Although no court rule governs the length of class-action objections, a
comparison with other filings suggests Kozinski got carried away. Kozinski filed
sixty-seven pages of argument in two Objections. His First Objection was thirty-
seven pages. The Plaintiffs’ Settlement Memorandum, to which he was objecting?
Eighteen pages.52 Nine other class members objected to the settlement,53 and
Kozinski’s First Objection alone was longer than all nine other objections
combined.54 The Plaintiffs’ response to all of the initial objections—Kozinski’s and
the other nine—was only twenty-one pages.55 Kozinski then responded with thirty
more pages of argument in his Second Objection.
And he didn’t need all of those words to make his argument. Here is
just one example of overkill: Kozinski includes six pages of particulars just
to show that the enhanced warranty was not the product of the class
action.56 In excruciating detail, he goes through “multiple public
statements by Nissan”57 on this point. He quotes at length from a letter
posted on Nissan’s website, pointing out in multiple places where Nissan
explained that it was acting solely to enhance customer satisfaction.58 And
then he describes another letter that precedes the letter he already
51 Patricia M. Wald, 19 Tips from 19 Years on the Appellate Bench, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 7, 9–10 (1999).
52 Preliminary Settlement Memorandum, supra note 34. 
53 In its order granting approval of the final settlement, the court identified fourteen objectors, but noted that three of those
objections had not been docketed because they didn’t comply with the court’s rules. Order Granting Final Approval of Class
Action Settlement and Awarding Attorneys’ Fees at 4, n. 2, Klee v. Nissan North American, Inc. (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2015) (No.
CV12-08238). And the court mistakenly counted one objector twice (Robin Jans). Id. So there were ten docketed objections,
including Judge Kozinski’s.
54 See Notice of Objection by Patricia and Mervyn Devine, Klee v. Nissan North American, Inc. (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013)
(No. CV12-08238) (3 pages); Notice of Objection by Robin Jans, Klee v. Nissan North American, Inc. (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26,
2013) (No. CV12-08238) (2 pages); Notice of Objection by Roberta Friedman and Leslie Kornblum, Klee v. Nissan North
American, Inc. (C.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2013) (No. CV12-08238) (3 pages); Objection to Proposed Class Action Settlement by Mark
D. Larsen, Klee v. Nissan North American, Inc. (C.D. Cal. Oct, 3, 2013) (No. CV12-08238) (5 pages); Notice of Objection by
Jonathan Eckhart and Colleen Walsh-Eckhart, Klee v. Nissan North American, Inc. (C.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2013) (No. CV12-
08238) (3 pages); Notice of Objection by Chinh T. Vo Owner of Nissan Leaf and Request for Evidentiary Hearing, Klee v.
Nissan North American, Inc. (C.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2013) (No. CV12-08238) (3 pages); Objection to Proposed Class Action
Settlement by Cody Pelech, Klee v. Nissan North American, Inc. (C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2013) (No. CV12-08238) (3 pages);
Objection to Proposed Settlement by Jon Chun, Klee v. Nissan North American, Inc. (C.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2013) (No. CV12-
08238) (3 pages); Objection to Proposed Class Action Settlement by Charles Gregory Smith, Jr., Klee v. Nissan North
American, Inc. (C.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2013) (No. CV12-08238) (4 pages). 
55 Plaintiff ’s Response to Objections to the Settlement, Klee v. Nissan North American, Inc. (C.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2013) (No.
CV12-08238).
56 First Objection, supra note 5, at 8–14.
57 Id. at 8.
58 Id. at 8–10.
59 Id. at 10–11.
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described.59 And then he describes another document—a series of
questions and answers about the warranty—that follows the two letters he
already described.60 And then he provides even more evidence from two
internal Nissan communications about the warranty.61 Honestly, I was
convinced by the first document. By the time I got to the fifth, I was well
past bored. In fact, Kozinski had me wondering whether he was hedging
against some contrary evidence he wasn’t showing me.
E. Block Quotes
Here is what Kozinski says about block quotes in “The Wrong Stuff”:
“[T]hey take up a lot of space but nobody reads them. . . . Let’s face it, if the
block quote really had something useful in it, the lawyer would have given
me a pithy paraphrase.”62
Kozinski’s lengthy Objections are made even lengthier by his use of
block quotes. Very, very long ones. In his First Objection, he includes two-
and-a-half pages of uninterrupted block quotes of material from the
Complaint, sandwiched between two short paragraphs that state simply
that the proposed settlement abandons the claim he quotes from.63 And
the six pages of argument he includes about the genesis of the enhanced
warranty, described above, would be shorter if Kozinski hadn’t inter-
spersed ten paragraphs of block quotes throughout,64 including one page
that contains four uninterrupted paragraphs of block quotes.65
Now, it is true that Kozinski is quoting from the Complaint and
evidentiary materials, while judges’ scorn for block quotes might be
directed more at quoting from case law. But these are outrageously long
quotes, with plenty of detail that can’t all be necessary. If he wanted to be
sure the evidentiary materials were part of the record, he could have
attached them to his Objections and then, in his argument, written
something like this: “In 12 separate places across five documents, Nissan
says that it is providing the enhanced warranty merely to bolster customer
relations, without once mentioning this lawsuit.” Or he could have quoted
much more selectively in his argument. In fact, Kozinski helpfully
underlines those parts of the block quotes that, I take it, he deems most
significant. Perhaps he should have quoted just those parts.
60 Id. at 11–12.
61 Id. at 12–14.
62 Kozinski, supra note 2, at 329.
63 First Objection, supra note 5, at 21–24.
64 Id. at 9–13.
65 Id. at 9.
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And now let me embrace some irony and drop in a block quote of my
own. In an interview with Bryan Garner, Judge Kozinski said this about
reading block quotes as a judge:
You know what? I don’t read block quotes. I skip over them. To me, this
is “yabba yabba yabba yabba yabba.” If there’s something good in there, I
expect the lawyer to tell me what it is. So the bigger the block quote, the
less I’m likely to find what you’re looking for. . . . But saying just “Here’s a
quote: Ta da!” It’s just foolish. It just means the lawyer was lazy. . . . What
I expect you to do is I expect you to go through and pull that stuff, and
make a judgment about the things that work, the things that will
persuade, and the things that are just “yabba yabba yabba yabba yabba.” .
. . I mean, you know what happens when I’ve got “yabba yabba yabba
yabba.” . . . My mind goes and I now start thinking about something else.
I start thinking about another case. Or probably I start thinking about
my gardening, or my chickens, . . . and pretty soon I’ve forgotten about
the case.66
Taking a cue from Judge Kozinski himself, I mostly skipped over the
block quotes in his Objections. I am sure there was some good stuff in
there, but if Kozinski couldn’t be bothered to pinpoint it, I certainly wasn’t
going to search for it.
II. Some Theories
As I discuss in section III below, Kozinski’s advocacy appears to have
been highly effective; his Objections persuaded both the parties and the
court to take another look at the settlement. After mediation in which
Kozinski himself participated, the parties revised the final settlement to
account for his concerns, and the court approved that revised final
settlement. Kozinski’s Objections were persuasive even though he seems
not to have taken his own advice. Why can he get away with deviating
from the canons of effective advocacy? I have a few theories:
A. Theory One: Judges Are People Too
Perhaps Kozinski’s Objections are evidence that judges, like many
attorneys, can’t resist the lure of the snarky attack, the intensifier, the urge
to throw in every possible argument with an excruciating level of detail.
66 Bryan Garner, Judge Alex Kozinski, U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeal (Pasadena): Overquoting (LawProse video Dec. 25,
2014), http://www.lawprose.org/bryan-garner/garners-interviews/judges-lawyers-writers-writing/judge-alex-kozinski-u-s-
9th-circuit-court-of-appeals-pasendena-overquoting/.
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Perhaps judges, like many attorneys, believe that principles of effective
written advocacy discouraging such excesses are usually wise, but gosh,
my case is a special one. All writers bring their own blinders to their
writing. Surely federal judges aren’t exempt.
But here’s the thing. Kozinski’s Objections are effective. They are
compelling and persuasive in spite of—and in some cases, because of—his
unorthodox stylistic choices. The snarky comments make us, the reader,
feel like we are in on the joke, teaming up with Kozinski against those
naughty lawyers. The hyperbole and informal language make the
arguments vivid and engaging. The “clearly” and “obviously” phrases are
unnecessary but not damaging.
There are only two deviations from the canon that really do
undermine Kozinski’s arguments: (1) His “fat briefs.” Certainly, they leave
the impression that Kozinski doth protest too much. (2) The numerous
and extensive block quotes, which lead the reader to skip over everything,
and thus pick up on nothing they contain. With those exceptions,
Kozinski’s Objections work. We need some other theories to figure out
why.
B. Theory Two: Class Actions Are Special
Of course, Kozinski isn’t writing as an attorney representing a client in
an ordinary lawsuit. He is writing as a class member acting on his own
behalf. He can take more liberties with his writing style than an attorney
could. That is partly because he doesn’t have to worry about undermining
his client’s case when he writes in whatever style he pleases; his own
interests are the ones on the line. That doesn’t necessarily mean Kozinski
should ignore the canons of effective advocacy. If his goal is to persuade, it
doesn’t matter whether he is representing a client or acting on his own
behalf. But a class member’s objection might be amenable to a looser
writing style without undermining its persuasive effect, because expec-
tations for class members are different than those for practicing attorneys.
Unlike attorneys, class members are not officers of the court. They have a
personal stake in the litigation, and so have some room to bring their
outrage, their emotion, and their personality to their argument in ways
that enhance, instead of detract from, their argument.
With respect to the attacks on counsel, there is another reason the
class-action context makes Kozinski’s approach more acceptable: the
conflict-of-interest problem that results from class representation. While
the attorney–client relationship always has the potential for such conflicts,
they are particularly salient in consumer class actions like the Nissan
LEAF litigation. This is a common criticism of consumer class actions,
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from both the bench67 and academia.68 Judge Posner has observed that
“courts have often remarked [on] the incentive of class counsel, in
complicity with the defendant’s counsel, to sell out the class by agreeing
with the defendant to recommend that the judge approve a settlement
involving a meager recovery for the class but generous compensation for
the lawyers . . . .”69 That, of course, is precisely the concern that Kozinski
centers his Objections around. And when reviewing class-action
settlements, federal courts consider whether there is evidence of collusion
between the parties.70 In fact, one commenter has recently observed that
courts are growing more hospitable to charges of unethical attorney
conduct in class-action litigation, and that both attorneys and objectors
are growing increasingly bold about leveling such charges.71 Courts also
recognize a presumption that the settlement is fair where the parties
engaged in arms-length negotiation after “meaningful discovery.”72 For all
of these reasons, it makes sense for Kozinski to highlight the conflict-of-
interest class counsel faces, and even suggest collusion and significant
discovery deficiencies, where those problems resulted in an arguably bad
outcome for the class. And as I discuss in the next theory below, Kozinski
not only has a particular interest in the conflict-of-interest present in class
representation, his day job as a judge gives him special insight into it.
It is also significant that the Nissan LEAF litigation was a settlement
class action, which means that the court hadn’t even certified a class action
when Kozinski filed his Objections. The court would be considering the
adequacy of class counsel’s representation as part of its review of the
proposed settlement. To certify the class (and approve the settlement), the
court had to find that the named parties adequately represented the
class.73 That requirement has been interpreted to mean that the named
parties “and their counsel [will] prosecute the action vigorously on behalf
of the class.”74 And in approving class counsel’s representation, the court
would have to consider (among other things) “the work counsel has done
67 See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 852 (1999); In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merchant Discount
Antitrust Litigation, 827 F.3d 223, 234 (2d Cir. 2016); Creative Montessori Learning Ctrs. v. Ashford Gear LLC, 662 F.3d 913,
918 (7th Cir. 2011).
68 See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1102–40 (1996); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1367–84 (1995).
69 Creative Montessori Learning Ctrs., 662 F.3d at 918. 
70 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 116 (2d Cir. 2005); In re Citigroup Inc. Securities Litigation,
965 F. Supp. 2d 369, 380–81 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
71 Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions in the Year 2026: A Prognosis, 65 EMORY L. J. 1569, 1586 (2016).
72 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 396 F.3d at 116.
73 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
74 Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 957 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).
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in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action”75 and “the
resources that counsel will commit to representing the class.”76 The court
could also consider “any other matter pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly
and adequately represent the interests of the class.”77 Those provisions
made concerns about whether class counsel was fairly representing the
class particularly appropriate concerns to raise in the Objections to the
settlement. In fact, one of Kozinski’s goals in his First Objection was
appointment of new class counsel because of the possible collusion he
identifies.78 But those provisions don’t require an objector to raise those
concerns with vitriol, snark, and requests for ethics investigations by the
bar.
C. Theory Three: Judges Are Special
Kozinski isn’t just any class member objecting to a settlement. He’s
also a federal judge. He walked into this lawsuit with built-in credibility
and prestige, and he can take advantage of that—whether intentionally or
subconsciously. He can get away with some things that would undermine
the credibility of an ordinary advocate. (It is also true that when he filed
his Objections, Kozinski was Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit—the Circuit
that hears appeals from the Central District of California, where the
Nissan LEAF litigation was docketed. His participation might have raised
concerns about his outsized influence on the lower-court judge. However,
those concerns were eliminated when a flurry of district-court judges
recused themselves in quick succession, leading to the appointment of a
senior status Ninth Circuit judge to sit by designation.)79
More broadly, Kozinski may be drawing on his position as a judge to
suggest problems with the class-action system. In fact, at a conference
about class actions at New York University School of Law, Kozinski
explicitly connected his own experiences in the LEAF litigation with
broader concerns about whether class actions are really working as they
75 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(A)(i).
76 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(A)(iv).
77 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(B).
78 First Objection, supra note 5, at 3.
79 Judge Pregerson, who was originally assigned to hear the case, recused himself because he had a social relationship with
Judge Kozinski, and had actually spoken with him about his Nissan LEAF. Order to Reassign Case Due to Self-Recusal
Pursuant to Section 3.2 of General Order 08-05, Klee v. Nissan North American, Inc. (C.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2013) (No. CV12-
08238). The two judges who were subsequently assigned to hear the case each recused based simply on Judge Kozinski’s
position as the Chief Judge of the court to which their decisions were appealed. Order Re Recusal, Klee v. Nissan North
American, Inc. (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2013) (No. CV12-08238); Order of Recusal, Klee v. Nissan North American, Inc. (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 24, 2014) (No. CV12-08238). Ultimately, Judge Tashima—who was then a senior-status judge on the Ninth Circuit
itself—was assigned to hear the case, sitting by designation. Designation of a Circuit Judge for Service in a District Court
within the Ninth Circuit, Klee v. Nissan North American, Inc. (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2014) (No. CV12-08238). 
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were intended to work.80 In a “Keynote Conversation” with Arthur Miller,
Judge Kozinski started by saying this about consumer class actions:
“Theoretically they’re great. As a practical matter, they seem to wind up
generating a lot of money for the lawyers and a lot of gornisht [Yiddish for
‘nothing’] for the consumers.”81 He went on to suggest ways to achieve
what he views as some of the goals of consumer class actions—deterring
and correcting bad behavior by companies—while rethinking the
mechanism through which those goals are achieved.82 Then he pivoted to
a lengthy discussion of his own experiences as a class member in the
Nissan LEAF litigation, further drawing out those themes about the roles
of class counsel, judges, and class members in consumer class actions.83
Given the way class actions work, if Kozinski didn’t use his Objections
to make detailed arguments about the problems he observed in the
lawsuit, it is likely that no one else would have. In fact, no one else did—at
least not with the specificity with which Kozinski did. In the Keynote
Conversation at NYU, Arthur Miller made precisely this point to Judge
Kozinski:
Part of it has got to lie with the degree of supervision the district judge
will impose on the settlement process. How much can we realistically
expect the district judges to do in what ends up as a non-adversary—
except if you’re hanging out—[proceeding]?84
In other words, it was only because Judge Kozinski was “hanging out”
in the lawsuit, through his Objections, that arguments against the
settlement were aired and taken seriously by the judge. That doesn’t mean
Kozinski needed—or benefited from—every last detail he included. In
fact, he probably could have made an equally or more compelling
argument with, for example, fewer block quotes from the record. But as a
sitting federal judge, Kozinski could rely on the likelihood that the judge
hearing the case would read his Objections closely. And even if the judge
80 Kozinski Keynote, supra note 4.
81 Id. at 2:19–2:34.
82 Id. at 5:00–7:17.
83 Id. at 10:00–18:05.
84 Id. at 18:13–18:37. Many commentators have identified the nonadversarial nature of class settlement hearings as a barrier
to a judge’s ability to determine whether a settlement is fair. See, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing:
Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1445 (2006) (“Because counsel for the plaintiff class and the
defendant share an interest in obtaining court approval of the settlement, judges are unlikely to receive information that
could be relevant to the fairness of the settlement from the parties themselves.”); Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts,
30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 808 (Spring 1997) (“Perhaps in no other context do we find courts entering binding decrees with
such a complete lack of access to quality information and so completely dependent on the parties who have the most to gain
from favorable court action.”).
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didn’t read all of those block quotes, Kozinski could rely on the judge’s
trusting his assurance that that they really did contain copious evidence
for the points he was making. In other words, Kozinski gets some benefit
out of emphasizing the quantity of evidence; and the multitude of block
quotes and lengthy list of details help him do that by providing cues
visually, even if the judge doesn’t read them. An ordinary objector—or
attorney—probably can’t get away with that. The better approach for most
writers is the one I suggested in section I above: attach the documents
separately and then quote them selectively in the argument.
Finally, Kozinski’s participation in the lawsuit also resulted in negative
publicity for the proposed settlement that the settlement almost certainly
would not otherwise have merited.85 While Judge Kozinski has disclaimed
any intent to stir up publicity through his Objections,86 the stylistic
choices he made—the hyperbole, the snark, and the rage—likely amplified
the media attention his Objections received, placing additional pressure
on the parties and the court to revisit the settlement terms.
D. Theory Four: Judge Kozinski Is Special
Alex Kozinski isn’t just any federal judge. He is a federal judge known
for his engaging and accessible writing style that often features a healthy
dose of snark, hyperbole, and colloquialisms. As readers who have come to
expect this kind of writing from Kozinski, we would have been disap-
pointed if he hadn’t employed his usual bluster and homespun style.
And let’s face it: Kozinski writes better than the rest of us mortals. He
can get away with writing this way because he is so good at it. So though
most attorneys should adhere to the canons of effective advocacy, there
are exceptions for masters like Kozinski. He knows how to write playfully
in measured and skillful ways that end up being effective. Most writers
aren’t that good. In “Making Your Case,” Justice Scalia and Brian Garner
make a similar point when they discuss whether attorneys should attempt
to use humor during oral argument. They write that “only someone with a
genuinely good sense of humor, and a feel for when humor is appropriate,
can pull this off,” and that “many of us who think we have those qualities
don’t.”87 They conclude that “the benefit [of using humor] is not worth the
risk.”88 The same is almost certainly true of attempts to deviate from the
canons of effective advocacy: some advocates can do it well, but not nearly
85 See supra notes 7, 26–27.
86 Kozinski Keynote, supra note 4, at 14:10–14:25.
87 SCALIA AND GARNER, supra note 2, at 187.
88 Id.
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as many of us do it as well as think we can, and not as frequently as we
think we can. And the benefit is rarely worth the risk.
III. Some Final Thoughts for Practitioners
Kozinski’s Objections violate the rules of persuasive writing and yet
are still persuasive. All four theories I articulate above are probably at play
in explaining why that is. For attorneys seeking persuasive-writing inspi-
ration from Kozinski’s turn as an advocate, the most important takeaway
might be this one: Don’t Try This At Home. It would almost certainly be a
mistake for attorneys to read Judge Kozinski’s Objections and conclude
that it is fine to allow attacks on counsel, snark, intensifiers, bloated
arguments, and lengthy block quotes to sneak into their own advocacy.
But Kozinski’s Objections do illustrate some macro lessons from the
canons of effective advocacy: overarching considerations like credibility
and audience matter.89 Kozinski leverages both the credibility he has
earned as a federal judge and his knowledge of courts’ expectations for
class-action objections, and uses them to his advantage in drafting
persuasive arguments.
You may be wondering at this point whether, in light of Judge
Kozinski’s multiple deviations from the canons of effective advocacy, I am
wrong about how persuasive his Objections really are. But it’s not just my
own sense that his Objections are so compelling; the record contains inde-
pendent evidence that Kozinski’s advocacy made a difference. After he
filed his Objections, Kozinski participated in mediation with the parties.
The parties then sought approval for a final settlement that addressed his
primary concerns. The revised settlement—which the court ultimately
approved—included these provisions: 
• An extended warranty that provided for replacement, not merely
repair, of batteries that had lost enough capacity to trigger the
warranty. The replacement battery Nissan would provide would be
the same one Nissan was installing in current model-year cars
instead of the original, deficient kind of battery.90
• Three months of free access to vehicle-charging stations for class
members residing in states where Nissan’s vehicle-charging program
was available.91
89 See, e.g., id. at 5–7 (discussing the importance of knowing what your audience wants) 205–06 (discussing the importance
of an advocate’s credibility); BEAZLEY, supra note 40, at 253 (discussing importance of credibility); IAN GALLACHER, LEGAL
COMMUNICATION AND RESEARCH 22–23 (2015) (discussing role audience expectations play in legal writing).
90 Order Granting Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Awarding Attorneys’ Fees at 5, Klee v. Nissan North
American, Inc. (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2015) (No. CV12-08238) [hereinafter Order Granting Final Approval].
91 Id.
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• A check for $50 to class members who no longer owned their Nissan
LEAF or who lived in a state without Nissan’s vehicle-charging
program.92
In other words, the final settlement provided additional consideration
beyond the enhanced warranty that Nissan had already independently
provided. Based on the revisions to the settlement, Kozinski withdrew his
Objections.93 And in approving the settlement, the court noted that
“Kozinski and [his wife] Tiffany’s withdrawal of their objection was in
direct response to mediation and the subsequent increased benefits for
the entire class.”94 Those “increased benefits for the entire class” were
almost certainly in direct response to Kozinski’s highly effective—and
highly unusual—advocacy.
92 Id. at 5–6.
93 Notice of Withdrawal of Objection of Marcy Tiffany and Alex Kozinski to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Approval of Class
Action Settlement, Klee v. Nissan North American, Inc. (C.D. Cal. May 4, 2015) (No. CV12-08238).
94 Order Granting Final Approval, supra note 90, at 22.
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